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Looking for the South-East 
 
Of all the British regions, the South East is the one whose conceptualisation is most 
awkward. It almost (but not quite) surrounds London, stretching from Southampton 
and Portsmouth in the South to Milton Keynes and Banbury in the North; and from 
Dover in the East to Reading and Oxford in the West. The government office and the 
headquarters of the regional development agency are in resolutely suburban 
Guildford, perhaps reflecting the absence of any defining urban centre (apart from 
London) around which a regional identity might cohere.  
 
The ‘official’ government region is somehow far too big and too fragmented to have a 
popular identity, and yet at the same time too small to capture the flows and networks 
that might define it as an economic activity space.  It incorporates some 13.5% of the 
population of the UK (with the highest population – at 8m - of any UK region), and it 
accounts for over 15% of UK GDP. It has an area of over 19 thousand sq km and a 
coastline of 1682 km. At least according to the South East Economic Development 
Agency (SEEDA), its economy ‘is the 22nd largest in the world’. In the 1990s, the 
region’s economy grew faster than any other UK region and it also exports more 
goods than any other UK region (SEEDA 2002a, p. 2). The average gross income of 
local residents is the highest in the UK. Over a quarter of regional GDP (2001 figures) 
is generated by financial and business services (significantly higher than the UK 
average). More surprisingly, perhaps, the share of engineering (at 7.2%) is also higher 
than the UK average and, although manufacturing as whole is less important than the 
UK average, in absolute terms manufacturing output (at £18.8 billion) in the region is 
second only to the North West (£20.4 bill.) and the West Midlands (£18.9 bill.) 
(SEEDA 2002a). 
 
The South East incorporates six cities with populations over 200, 000 - Southampton, 
Portsmouth, Brighton, Milton Keynes, Oxford and Reading - and internally its sub-
regions are diverse and sharply differentiated (see, e.g., SEEDA 2002a pp. 11-13). 
SEERA points to the ‘polycentric and rural nature of much of the South East’ 
(SEERA 2003, p. 60), and these divisions also find an expression in the institutional 
relations within the region. As John et al (2002, p. 738) note, ‘The region is 
fragmented into counties and sub-regions, which jealously guard their autonomy and 
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fear centralization’. They point to the existence of a ‘Maze of competing partnerships’ 
(John et al 2002, p. 738). 
 
According to a survey conducted by MORI for the South East of England Regional 
Assembly (SEERA 2004b), residents are more likely to identify two areas that are not 
in the ‘South East’ (Essex – by 29% of those responding - and London – 25%) as part 
of the region than three that are (Buckinghamshire – 22%, Isle of Wight – 19% - and 
Oxfordshire – 16%). Although a relatively high proportion of the population (67%) 
confirm that they are ‘proud’ to live in the region, a significant proportion (41%) also 
agrees that the South East is too diverse to be thought of as a single region (although 
there is at least one respect in which it is not particularly diverse – whereas 29% of 
people living in London are members of ethnic minority groups, that is only true of 
8% of those living in the South East, a figure below the average for England as a 
whole).  
 
Regional ‘stakeholders’ interviewed for the MORI survey are explicit about the 
problems of regional identity. ‘It just doesn’t really work as a region,’ says one. 
‘There is absolutely no interest at all between Dover and Milton Keynes’. And 
another comments, ‘We are not really a proper region. There are such enormous 
differences between the deprivation of Hastings and the huge prosperity of the 
Thames Valley, Berkshire and Oxfordshire…There is no community of interests. The 
only thing that links us is affordable housing’.  As John et al (2002, p. 734) confirm, 
‘Elite networks rarely identify with the South East region, nor do they mobilize 
behind regional institutions’. 
 
Through another lens, however, it could be argued that the problem is a rather 
different one. Perhaps the reason the region does not quite work, is that the 
administrative boundaries which define it are simply too restrictive. So, for example, 
from a popular perspective, the identity of the South East of England continues to be 
defined in large part by the presence of London as its (formally absent) core. 
Closeness to London is explicitly identified by residents in the MORI survey as one of 
the fundamental reasons for their satisfaction with life in the region. And, of course, it 
remains the place of employment for many of those who live in the South East – over 
half a million commuters travel in by rail every day. And much of the industry 
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(whether production, financial services, knowledge based or logistics) in the South 
East is located there precisely because of its closeness to London. Some six per cent 
of London’s GDP is generated by commuters from the South East, while eleven per 
cent of the residents of the South East who are in employment, travel to London to 
work (Robinson 2004, p. 14).  
 
At the same time, the growth of the South East seems to bring more and more of 
England into its ambit, reflected, for example, in the plans for ‘sustainable 
communities’ which have lead to the identification of ‘sub-regions’ that cut across the 
official regional boundaries as strategies have been developed for Milton Keynes and 
the South Midlands and for the Thames Gateway (ODPM 2003). The former sits 
astride the South East, the East Midlands and the East of England, the latter 
incorporates parts of the South East, London and the East of England.  
 
The remainder of this chapter focuses on three different ways in which the region is 
being and has been defined. The next section considers the construction of an 
‘official’ government region, increasingly defined by the actions and plans of a range 
of regional agencies. That is followed by a section which explores arguments for the 
emergence of a ‘Greater’ South East (bringing together the government regions of the 
South East London and the East of England). The third of these sections reflects on 
approaches which seek to define the region in ‘relational’ terms. Finally, a concluding 
section briefly considers the implications of each of these approaches for public 
policy.  
 
Official representations: making up a region 
 
Development agencies were set up throughout England in 1999 and fostering the 
competitiveness of regions was presented as a means of providing them with a secure 
(competitive) economic base, capable of underpinning the financial well-being of 
their residents (moving beyond welfarism – see, e.g., Morgan 1997). Collectively the 
competitiveness of individual regions was seen as a way of enhancing the overall 
competitiveness of the country, but the regional agenda was also presented as a means 
of achieving political and economic redistribution. It was intended to ‘promote 
sustainable economic development’ (Department of the Environment Transport and 
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the Regions 1997), with a ‘greater focus on wealth creation and jobs’ (John Prescott, 
quoted in Jones and MacLeod 1999, p. 301). In the coded language of new Labour 
politics, a focus on the ‘regions’ offered a means of acknowledging the existence of 
economic inequality, as well as promising a programme of renewal through a form of 
economic self-help, rather than redistribution. 
 
The arrival of the new regionalism, however, had a particular significance for the 
South East of England. Unlike the 1930s and the period after 1945 when ‘regional 
policy’ was explicitly oriented towards shifting ‘growth’ from the more prosperous to 
the less prosperous regions of the country, this time the South East, too, is a region, 
apparently driven by similar needs to the others. Regional policy is no longer a policy 
for a set of ‘regions’, defined as those places with economic and social problems 
which lie outside the golden heartlands of London and the Home Counties. Every 
region is being enjoined to improve its economic competitiveness. The South East of 
England Development Agency makes no bones about its purpose, with a strap-line 
that promises that it is ‘Working for England’s World Class Region’ and the explicit 
claim that it is ‘driving force of the UK’s economy’ or the ‘powerhouse of the UK 
economy’ (see also SEEDA 1999, 2002a, 2002b).  
 
While joint planning arrangements (given the Soviet style acronym of SERPLAN) 
predated the creation of the regional development agency and its associated regional 
assembly they had little authority in shaping any emergent South East regional 
identity or, indeed, its economic direction, even if they did cover a wider area and 
included London in their remit (see, e.g.,  Lock 1989). Alongside the significantly 
expanded Government Office of the South East, the development agency has taken on 
the role of giving the region more of a shared identity and, perhaps more important, 
attempting to shape its economic direction. Not surprisingly, the new agencies start 
from the borders they have been given and seek through planning and promotional 
practice to give them a meaning that goes beyond the bureaucratic. Following the 
logic of the new regionalism, the region is effectively to be defined by its competitive 
position, formally its competitive position with respect to regions elsewhere in 
Europe, but implicitly, at least, within the UK, too. 
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SEEDA explicitly defines the South East of England in terms of its economic success 
– as the UK’s growth region, the region whose prosperity drives that of the rest of the 
country. The drive to regional competitiveness is, therefore, identified as a national as 
well as a regional imperative, since although the South East is understood to have 
grown faster than other regions of the UK and – indeed – than London over the last 
decade, it is also stressed that the South-East’s competitors are outside the UK, and 
particularly in Europe (see, e.g., SEEDA 2002a). If the South East does not succeed in 
claiming its rightful place among Europe’s elite regions, it is implied, then the UK 
(and the UK’s other regions) will also suffer. 
 
The Regional Economic Strategy forefronts an image of the region as ‘a dynamic, 
diverse and knowledge-based economy that excels in innovation and turning ideas 
into wealth creating enterprise’. The aim of the strategy is to ensure that by 2012 the 
region is acknowledged to be one of the fifteen ‘top performing regional economies’ 
in the world (SEEDA 2002b, p. 8). The South East is said to be the UK’s ‘global 
gateway’ and ‘an international region’, providing a way into both the UK and Europe 
for multinational companies, attracting almost as much foreign direct investment as 
London (SEEDA 2002, p. 13).  From this perspective, it is simply taken for granted 
that it is a more or less coherent ‘region’ capable of being understood as a unified 
whole.  
 
But the current policy game has another vitally important aspect, which encourages a 
focuses on the differences within the region and particularly the differences in income 
levels and prosperity within it. Just as others point to the differences in wealth 
between regions, so in the South East emphasis is placed on differences within it. 
Since the current politics of regionalism require regional actors to emphasise the 
problems they face in order to attract resource, there has recently been a remarkable 
turnaround in official representations. Where it was once left to agencies such as 
SEEDS (South East Economic Development Strategy, a local authority sponsored 
initiative of the 1980s) (SEEDS 1987. See also Breugel, 1992) to point to divisions 
within the South East, now the new regional agencies sponsor research to identify 
them so that they have something with which to bargain in the search for state 
funding.  
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The broad divisions identified in the various texts of the regional agencies are clear 
enough. A growth belt – or ‘area of economic success’ - is identified in the West of 
the region, stretching from Winchester to Milton Keynes and Newbury to Gatwick, 
while a coastal belt to the East, incorporating areas bordering the Channel and the 
Thames Estuary, is identified as facing problems of decline (both in tourism and other 
traditional industries).Finally, an area is identified that has a concentration of 
declining industries, particularly those associated with defence or port activities  (see, 
e.g. SEEDA 2002b, pp. 12-14). 
 
There is an explicit focus on ‘tackling disadvantage’ within the region. So, for 
example, although unemployment is low, the point is made that the numbers 
unemployed in the South East are high in absolute terms; while educational 
achievement is high in Buckinghamshire, it is low in Portsmouth; while the 
employment rate for the region as a whole is higher than the national average, it is 
lower in the Isle of Wight, Brighton and Hove and Southampton (SEEDA 2002b, p. 
10). The South East Region Social Inclusion Statement published in 2002, lists areas 
suffering deprivation. In particular it highlights the extent to which there are pockets 
of deprivation in the region’s coastal towns, such as Hastings and Thanet. Of the 119 
wards identified as being among the 20% most deprived in the country, 94 are in 
coastal towns (GOSE 2002, p. 40). 46 of the 50 most deprived wards in the region are 
in Hampshire, Sussex and Kent, ‘mainly along the ‘coastal strip’’ (SEERA 2003, p. 
27).  
 
The impact of the closure of the East Kent coal fields is also noted as an issue in the 
social inclusion statement, since this is said to have left ‘social scars’, as well as 
dereliction, while individual wards in some of the region’s urban areas contain 
significantly deprived populations – particular attention is drawn by GOSE (2002, p. 
40) to a ward in Portsmouth in which child poverty is a particular problem, and in one 
ward in Brighton poor skills levels are identified as an issue of major concern, while a 
ward in Slough has the worst problems of poor housing and overcrowding in the 
region. Even in a region that seeks so strongly to identify itself as a centre for 
knowledge-based industry, the variation in educational and skills levels between 
different parts of it can be start. Nearly 60% of working age adults who live in 
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Wokingham have qualifications at NVQ level 3 or above, while in Medway the figure 
is below 35% (SEERA 2003, p. 27).  
 
Rural decline is also an issue that concerns the various agencies, both because of the 
fall in available agricultural employment and because of the reduction in housing 
available for local residents and their children. Not surprisingly, perhaps, attention is 
drawn to the fact that the experience of social exclusion may be worse for people 
trapped in more prosperous areas (like those in the South East), because access to 
appropriate services may be restricted by lack of overall demand (GOSE 2002, pp. 
40-41). And, although in proportional terms deprivation in the South East is clearly 
far lower than in other regions of the UK, SEEDA also stresses that the ‘sheer size of 
the South East means that the actual number of excluded people in the region is 
comparable to and can exceed those in regions that are better known for their high 
levels of deprivation’ (SEEDA 2002b, p. 42), while the Draft Regional Plan also notes 
that the disparities between the incomes of individuals within the region are the 
widest of any English region (SEERA 2004, p. 2). 
 
The search for a spatial pattern to issues of deprivation and social exclusion is 
ultimately unconvincing, since the most deprived wards are scattered like a rather 
disconnected necklace along the coast round from the Thames Gateway, through 
Thanet and Hastings, to Brighton and Hove and on to the Isle of Wight and 
Southampton, with a few others dotted around in a series of urban areas - in Reading, 
Slough, High Wycombe, Milton Keynes and Oxford. The explanations for the 
problems facing people who live in these wards owe little to any shared set of 
‘regional’ issues. On the contrary, listing the areas concerned helps once more to 
indicate the relative incoherence of the region being so actively constructed in the 
planning documents and economic strategies. They are discussed together not because 
they have much in common, but because they happen to have been clustered together 
in a newly invented region. 
 
If one vision for the South East focuses on competitiveness and growth, stressing 
what is seen to be the region’s key role in underpinning the UK’s economic 
prosperity, a second is defensive, recognising the inevitability of growth, but seeking 
to protect residents from its environmental and other impacts. In a sense this captures 
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key tensions within the region – it retains some of the features of the old ‘home 
counties’ (see, e.g., Hamnett 198?), reinforced by the rise of an extended suburbia at 
the same time as being the location for expanding service industries, particularly in 
financial and business services. The growth of employment in these industries both 
underpins the prosperity of local residents and threatens their ‘quality of life’. It is in 
this context that the language of ‘sustainability’ is so effectively mobilised, both to 
find ways of sustaining economic growth and to protect the new middle classes from 
its more unpleasant aspects.  
 
‘Sustainability’ is, of course, a term that can take on many meanings in the context of 
economic development. Sometimes, the emphasis is on finding ways of ensuring that 
economic growth will be sustained (e.g. through the provision of necessary 
infrastructure, housing for key workers etc.), while on other occasions the emphasis 
may be placed on ways of protecting areas from environmental depredation, ensuring 
that transport networks remain effective or that flooding is avoided. The tension 
between these approaches is particularly apparent in the language of the new regional 
agencies. SEEDA is more concerned with the former, while SEERA is more likely to 
emphasise the latter, particularly as a means of defending the relatively privileged 
position of existing residents of the South East. An ‘Integrated Regional Framework’ 
has been developed with a range of regional partners and an explicit emphasis is 
placed finding ways ‘to reduce the negative effects of economic growth’ (SEERA 
2004a).  
 
In the draft South East Plan approved for consultation by SEERA in 2004, the tension 
is explicitly acknowledged:  ‘On the one hand economic growth and concomitant 
development has been a necessary condition for prosperity and social and 
environmental action. On the other, some consider that the price of that growth in 
terms of resource consumption and other impacts is too high and unsustainable in the 
long-term’ (SEERA 2004c, p. 4). Despite the care of its authors to present the tension 
explicitly, when the draft plan was presented to the Assembly in November 2004, the 
range of proposals for housing growth in the region was rejected and a lower range 
was agreed for wider consultation. In other words, for however brief a moment, the 
protective instincts of the interests represented in the Assembly overcame the 
sponsors of growth. 
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These issues are also at the core of the work of a Commission on Sustainable 
Development (supported by the counties of the region, as well as 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers) which is being undertaken through the Institute of Public 
Policy Research. The first working paper produced by the Commission suggests that 
increased growth should not be a priority for the region, not least because its author 
questions the region’s role as a driver of growth within the UK Robinson 2004, pp. 7-
8).  Instead he points to the need to find ways of coping with some of the problems of 
the region’s ‘success’ (particularly by challenging disparities within the region and 
tackling issues relating to traffic congestion, the shortage of affordable housing, the 
consumption of natural resources and maintaining the quality of the environment) 
(Robinson 2004). The second working paper (Foley 2004) explicitly sets out to 
explore what are seen as ‘the problems of success’ and emphasises that public policy 
within a region should be directed towards improving or maintaining the quality of 
life for its residents. 
 
It is in this context that the language of social exclusion and deprivation, of internal 
divisions within the region, and the search for ways of tackling these problems also 
has the paradoxical policy benefit of offering an apparently painless way of resolving 
the tensions – growth may be delivered through the regeneration of deprived areas 
(such as the Thames Gateway, but also the other areas on the ‘coastal strip’ and parts 
of Kent) as well as development on the edge of the region (in Milton Keynes – to 
which there is a long tradition of shifting development to defend the leafy suburbs of 
South Buckinghamshire) (see, e.g., Charlesworth and Cochrane 1994). The quality of 
life of the prosperous ‘core’ can be protected, while growth is diverted to those parts 
of the region that need it. 
 
Similarly, the mantra of ‘affordable housing’ is one that is shared by all the agencies 
involved in the region and is an issue that is identified as a clear concern by residents 
in the MORI survey referred to above. However, the understanding of what is meant 
by ‘affordable housing’ is not necessarily shared in quite so straightforward a fashion. 
For residents, of course, it is a complaint about the costs they incur by living in the 
South East, although (in some areas, at least) tempered by a desire to ensure that 
development does not threaten their lifestyles. For SEEDA, GOSE and the Office of 
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the Deputy Prime Minister (ODPM), ‘affordable housing’ is a coded expression of the 
need to provide the necessary infrastructure to underpin continued growth. If growth 
in the 1980s and 1990s was held back by labour market constraints and overheating 
(see, e.g., Peck and Tickell 1995) then the task must be to find ways of reducing the 
likelihood of a similar occurrence. Providing housing for those who are needed to 
sustain the boom, even where (like teachers and other public sector workers, but also 
the growing army of service workers in retail, distribution, hotels and catering) they 
are not highly paid ‘knowledge workers’ is identified as a priority (see, e.g., ODPM 
2003). 
 
Although the focus of the regional agencies is on the narrowly defined South East as a 
more or less coherent entity, there is also a recognition that its connections to and 
linkages with neighbouring regions are significant. The existence of boundaries is 
taken for granted, but the potential importance of ‘cross-boundary links’ is 
acknowledged (SEEDA 2002b, p. 13). There is even an acknowledgement that there 
may be a shared interest between Kent (particularly its coastal towns) and regional 
authorities in Northern France. The South East is identified as an ‘integrated region’, 
that is a region ‘integrated’ into wider regional context, and, in this context at least, 
the interrelationship with London is recognised as paramount. Other explicitly 
identified linkages include the Central South Coast (which stretches along from 
Portsmouth and Southampton into the South West region) and the Oxford to 
Cambridge Arc (which rather hopefully promises the creation of a major cluster of 
knowledge based industries that stretches across the north of the region from Oxford 
to Cambridge in the East of England) (see O2C Arc 2003). The most significant 
linkages, however, are probably those associated with the Thames Gateway and 
Milton Keynes and the South Midlands, since they (along with Ashford, on a smaller 
scale) have been identified as areas for significant growth in the government’s plans 
for the development of ‘sustainable communities’ (ODPM 2003, GOSE et al 2004, 
ODPM 2004). The extent of these proposals and their likely impact (as populations 
double in size and major investment takes place in infrastructure and housing) makes 
it difficult to sustain a narrow focus on the official South East, since many of the most 
important development decisions affecting that region will be taking place either 
outside it or on its extreme edges, even if one of the reasons for focusing development 
there may be to protect the heartlands from the impact of growth – maintaining a 
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relatively ‘green and pleasant land’ for those in the suburbs and ‘rural’ exurbs of the 
region.  
 
Bigger is better: the ‘Grater’ South East 
 
If the curiously truncated and incoherent official region is ultimately unconvincing as 
a representation that reflects either popular understandings or economic linkages, is 
there any other basis on which the ‘South East’ may be understood and identified? 
Until 2001, when the most recent Regional Planning Guidance was issued (GOSE et 
al 2001), for planning purposes the South East continued to be defined as including 
London and the counties of Essex, Bedfordshire and Hertfordshire, so that the South 
East was made up of London and the Rest of the South East. The Rest of the South 
East was effectively the doughnut around London, which meant (in principle at least) 
that a rather different regional vision was in play. Some of the same features remain 
identifiable (Milton Keynes and Ashford are identified for growth and the Thames 
Gateway is identified as a priority for regeneration) but the region is seen as a whole 
and at least some of today’s border regions – those with London and the East of 
England – are in the centre rather than on the edge of the region.  
 
In this context, perhaps those who espouse the notion of a Greater South East have a 
greater claim to be identifying a more coherent approach to understanding the region. 
In their discussion of the South East as a ‘core region’ Breheny and Congdon (1989) 
start from an understanding of the region as incorporating the currently ‘official’ 
South East, London and the Rest of the South East (and sometimes going further to 
include other parts of the ‘Western crescent’ identified by Hall et al, 1987). They 
suggest that this South East is ‘an example of a ‘core’ region, occupying a dominant 
position, economically, politically and culturally, within a capitalist economy which 
exhibits distinct and enduring uneven development’ (Breheny and Congdon 1989, p. 
1). 
 
Gordon (2003 and 2004), too, argues strongly that the focus should be on the  
‘greater’ South East, incorporating the East of England as well as the government 
regions of London and the South East. In a sense (paradoxically perhaps) his 
argument is one that constructs this super region as a city region, one whose central 
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focus is London. It is the spread of activities building on the strengths of the London 
economy, coupled with a transport network that focuses on London, that define the 
region. However, Gordon emphasises that developments since the 1970s have helped 
to redefine the region, as the spread of business services functions and high tech 
industry has helped to build a wider range of centres with their own linkages into 
national and international networks. As he puts it: ‘In this regionalised version of 
London, outer areas now substantially contribute to its agglomeration economies, as 
well as continuing to benefit from those rooted in central London’ (Gordon 2004, p. 
41). Pain (2004) explores the extent to which the South East (broader than borders – 
defined by connections in advanced producer services) is polycentric – i.e. links 
between centre rather than through London. Evidence strongly suggests that links 
through London are still the most important but also highlights linkages that cross cut 
the region between Cambridge and Reading, Reading and Southampton and MK and 
Southampton (see also SEERA 2004, pp. 43-4, which presents evidence from the 
same research project to support the argument for the emergence of a series of 
functional urban regions across the Greater South East, as well as highlighting the 
growth of cross-commuting between towns in the wider region).  
 
In other words, Gordon is identifying the emergence of a region whose coherence is 
not simply a function of its core. He draws on the work of Simmie et al (2002) to 
highlight the interdependence of the different parts of the region – both noting the 
dispersal of innovative firms across the region (i.e. not simply clustered in London) 
and emphasising that it is regional connections (including air services and labour 
markets) that sustain the region’s growth. Simmie confirms that the Greater South 
East ‘contains the highest concentration of innovative firms in the UK’ (Simmie 2003, 
p. 614).  
 
Gordon argues that such are the interconnections within this region that it is only 
through regional success that internal divisions and inequalities can be minimised: 
‘For spatial equity within the GSE, as well as for its overall employment rate’, he 
says, ‘it is the competitive performance of the region as a whole which matters’ 
(Gordon 2004, p. 42). From this perspective, the current structures of regional 
governance and planning are not only inappropriate but may actually have negative 
consequences for the development of the region and, because of its centrality to the 
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UK economy and its wider role as centre for innovation, for well-being of the country 
as a whole.  
 
Gordon shares the emphasis of SEEDA (albeit for the wider region) on the need for 
the South East to be supported in achieving economic success, and for this reason he 
maintains that ‘it deserves serious attention to its needs and management on a 
continuing basis and structures which maximise the chance of this occurring’ (Gordon 
2004, p. 64). He acknowledges a potential split between the ‘region’ with which 
people may identify as residents and the Greater South East for which he argues there 
needs to be coherent planning and political leadership. Gordon’s own suggestion is 
for a political leader connected into national government, heading up ‘a single, 
strengthened super-regional Government Office’ which would work with a more fine-
grained and disaggregated set of regional assemblies and agencies. In other words, his 
way of dealing with the tensions between the expectations of residents and the needs 
of the national economy is to explicitly separate the role of representation (the various 
regional and sub-regional agencies) from that of planning and fostering economic 
development (a super government office). 
 
Beyond the boundaries 
 
Another way of moving beyond the existing boundaries is to consider regions as what 
Allen et al (1998) refer to as spatialised social relations, that is as places which are 
actively constructed by the economic and social networks and linkages within them 
and which connect them to other places. In most political debates on regions, in 
practice emphasis is often placed on their constructions as economic activity spaces, 
but – as Amin and Thrift (1994) stress in their discussion of the significance of 
‘institutional thickness’ – this may include the cultural and institutional relationships 
that underpin economic processes. Unlike the fixed entities generated by the texts and 
the rhetoric of the official regionalism, this approach suggests rather more fluid 
possibilities and implies the possibility of overlapping regions of different sizes. 
These are regions that may vary across time and are made and remade by human 
interaction (within which – of course – the cartographers, government officials and 
regional politicians play their own part). These regions do not have clear and 
permanent boundaries, and are defined by their positions within networks, which 
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stretch out much wider nationally and internationally through a series of 
interconnections.  
 
Allen et al (1998) argue that in the 1980s and 1990s the ‘South East’ was defined and 
understood itself as a ‘growth’ region and specifically a region of neo-liberal growth. 
Its national dominance was expressed through this definition which reflected a 
particular confluence of political, cultural and economic dynamics. Although it was 
presented as a model of deregulated growth, in practice, it relied on high degree of 
state intervention both to achieve the particular forms of ‘deregulation’ that were 
driven through and tended to advantage the South East, as well as significant 
investment in large scale public infrastructure, for example, associated with road 
construction, form by-passes to the M25. The growth of the South East was 
predicated on decline elsewhere in the UK, in the wake of large scale (state 
sponsored) industrial restructuring. In other words, it was not possible to view the 
region as self-contained and simply building its own competitiveness. Its positioning 
within a wider national (and European) system helped to shape its growth. 
 
Viewing the South East as a ‘growth’ region confirms the limitations of more static 
definitions, and it also highlights some of the difficulties of utilising generally 
available data in pursuing dynamic processes of change. There is no single correct 
definition of the growth region. It stretches far beyond the ‘standard’ region for some 
forms of economic and cultural relationships (e.g. to Cambridge, through the threads 
connecting high technology industry, and pulled to Wiltshire by the tentacles of the 
luxury – ‘country’ – housing market, as well as the M4 corridor) (see also Gordon et 
al 2003). Meanwhile, within the ‘standard’ region there are substantial spatio-social 
discontinuities – holes and hot spots (the holes represented by the high water mark of 
Fordism in places like the Medway Towns, Portsmouth and Southampton and the hot 
spots represented by Gatwick airport, developments around Heathrow and the new 
town of Milton Keynes). From this perspective, it could be argued that the region is 
spatially discontinuous, in the sense that some places currently defined as being in the 
South East are not (e.g. much of Kent and the coastal South) while other places 
located far away from the current borders of the region should be seen as part of it, 
precisely because they are so tightly connected through economic and cultural 
networks. 
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Attempting to force the South East (however its boundaries are defined) into a 
regional template, that is one that starts from an implicit understanding of regions as 
more or less coherent economic spaces, based around the clustering of particular 
activities, may itself be unhelpful. Some have argued that the formal and informal 
networks that define the ‘power’ of London and the South East are national (and 
potentially international), rather than regional. Peck and Tickell (1992) see this as a 
weakness as well as a strength in the boom years of the 1980s they argue that the 
‘region enjoyed strong economic growth as a result of its privileged place in national 
regulation strategies and international accumulation strategies, but subsequently was 
shown to lack appropriate regional regulatory mechanisms for the sustenance of 
growth’ (Peck and Tickell, 1992, p. 359). For Amin et al (2003) this is a fundamental 
issue which sets the ‘South East’ in a longer cultural history. They relate its national 
role back to a ‘courtly’ structure (focused on the crown and state) through which the 
apparently necessary centrality of London and the South East is reproduced in terms 
of the institutional relations of class and politics with their associated powers of 
exclusion and inclusion (Amin et al. 2003, pp. 9-12). ‘London is the presumptive 
location of the national’, they argue. ‘It is in this sphere that the political meets the 
economic meets the national imaginary’ (Amin et al 2003, p. 13). Amin and Thrift 
(1994, p. 17) acknowledge that the South East does not exhibit the rich set of finely 
grained cultural and economic networks that might be characterised as ‘institutional 
thickness’ (often seen as a prerequisite for economic growth), but it is where the 
national elites learn to be elites.  
 
Amin et al (2003) question the extent to which the North/South divide should be seen 
simply as a consequence of the working out of market forces. On the contrary they 
suggest that the centralisation of power in London and the South East means that a 
‘significant element of ‘national policy making effectively functions as an 
unacknowledged regional policy for the South Eastern part of England’ (Amin and 
Thrift 2003, p. 17). So, for example, they suggest that national economic policy is 
overly influenced by the state of the regional economy in London and South East, 
with steps being taken to restrain the economy when the region is ‘overheating’, even 
when the Rest of the Country still has significant capacity for growth. They also 
suggest that tax policy which reduces income tax for high earners, in practice shifts 
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resource to London and the South East because of the concentration of high earners in 
the region. 
 
Effectively Amin and Thrift (2003) turn the claims often made for the South East as a 
‘growth region’ that drives the British economy on their head. Instead they suggest 
that it tends to work as a drain on the rest of the country. If the South East is a ‘core’ 
region, then, according to this analysis, it is one whose relationship with the rest of the 
British economy is rather peculiar, since in the 1980s ‘in effect the political economy 
of the south east as ‘growth region’ operated in ways which restricted the possibility 
of growth in other regions of the UK’ (Allen et al 1998, p. 119). Amin et al (2003) 
highlight the drain of graduates to the region from elsewhere in the UK, which 
reinforces the centralisation of the knowledge economy in London and the South East, 
at the expense of other parts of the country. Hepworth and Spencer (2003) highlight 
the extent to which London and the South East dominate British knowledge economy 
and highlight the existence of an ‘uneven or centralised geography of the knowledge 
economy’, pointing to the existence of ‘‘brain drains’ that undermine capacity 
building, graduate underemployment and local bottlenecks for people with 
intermediate qualifications’. There is, they argue, ‘ a relatively distributed pattern of 
growth in qualifications and the graduate labour pool contrasting with a highly 
concentrated pattern of knowledge-intensive job creation that favours London and its 
hinterland, and the South East more widely’ (Hepworth and Spencer 2003, Executive 
Summary). Among graduates who move to study in a region in which they did not 
study or originate from, the Greater South East is the most favoured first destination 
(Uzzell 2004, p. 20). 
 
What sort of South East? 
 
The three versions of the South East that have been discussed in this chapter each has 
a strong claim to representing the ‘real’ South East and each has significant 
implications for public policy.  
 
The first is in a sense the embodiment of current public policy, in the context of a 
newly regionalised England. The regional agencies play an active part in defining the 
region, identifying relations (including divisions) within it and giving some meaning 
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to the borders around it (not least as they identify cross-border linkages). But they 
also embody some of the tensions within the policy, in particular, those between the 
drive for ‘growth’ and the desire of residents to defend their quality of life 
(particularly those residents in relatively privileged enclaves) (given institutional 
expression to some extent in the different roles of SEEDA and SEERA, and 
ultimately policed by GOSE). And they reflect the difficulties of managing a ‘region’ 
whose borders are so porous and which does not include many of the areas whose 
development effectively shapes what is possible within it. The drivers of change are 
not ‘regional drivers’. 
 
The second finds a route through by identifying a Greater South East, which seeks to 
capture the broader economic linkages and to create an entity within which plans can 
be given some meaning. The institutional tensions reflected in the first model are 
overcome by suggesting that economic and regional planning (that is planning for 
growth in the interests not only of the region but also of the country as whole) would 
be conducted under the aegis of a super government office, who would work with and 
negotiate with a wide variety of regional and local agencies capable of reflecting the 
wishes of those they represented. The extent to which such a powerful agency could 
ever be created is – of course – an open question, and it is perhaps worth pointing out 
that the population of this super-region would be almost half that of England. Its 
construction in this way would have fundamental (and potentially threatening) 
consequences for the rest of England (as well as the devolved countries of the UK). 
 
The third (certainly as articulated by Amin et al 2003) takes an approach that 
implicitly questions the value of regional structures of the sort that currently exist, but 
also questions the extent to which (whatever its borders) the South East can be seen as 
a positive driver of the UK economy. On the contrary, it is argued, the central role 
that is currently accorded to the South East in the UK economy and society masks the 
extent to which it effectively undermines growth elsewhere in the country, by sucking 
in talent, public and private investment. Instead of a programme of redistribution from 
the South East to the rest of the country, however, they argue for a different starting 
point, in which public policy is ‘decentered’ and the activities which it is currently 
simply assumed will be undertaken in London and the South East are instead located 
elsewhere. Like the first, when it emphasises the significance of inequalities within 
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the region, so does the third, arguing that issues of distribution can best be handled 
intra regionally, with little national intervention. 
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